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Introduction and summary
New technologies, such as electronic payments, offer 
the possibility of innovative remedies to congestion 
problems facing cities throughout the United States. 
However, the implementation of such remedies involves 
a number of difficult economic and political challenges. 
Indeed, successful implementation of technology-based 
policies depends critically on devising optimal pricing 
schemes taking into account network adoption dynamics. 
It also depends on consumer acceptance of the tech-
nology itself. Notably, prompting the switch to elec-
tronic payments raises many of the same challenges 
as the more radical congestion relief initiatives, such 
as variable pricing and transition to private ownership 
of roads. In this article, we study the effectiveness of 
a particular application of pricing incentives, in con-
junction with a mass-marketing campaign, to foster 
adoption of electronic toll collection in Illinois.1 
The first stage in this process came on January 1, 
2005, when the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority 
(also known as the Illinois Tollway)2 doubled the toll 
for cash payers but kept it unchanged (at $0.40 at most 
toll plazas) for electronic payers. We use data provid-
ed by the Illinois Tollway to show that the resulting 
substantial change in relative prices generated a large 
aggregate response, even though the increase in toll 
costs constituted a rather small change in overall com-
muting costs. We also argue that the large relative price 
change allowed the Illinois Tollway to resolve a diffi-
cult coordination problem of convincing motorists to 
adopt electronic payment in exchange for benefits, 
such as open road tolling,3 that could be realized only 
if enough other motorists were also convinced. More-
over, we analyze the relative importance of price, in-
come, and fixed participation costs in consumer choice 
of a particular payment mechanism. By doing so, we 
show that the aggregate effect of the price change masks 
interesting heterogeneity in motorists’ responses. 
Whereas higher cash tolls served as a key factor in in-
fluencing lower-income households to adopt the elec-
tronic payment option (the “cost” channel), affluent 
households responded more to the decline in the fixed 
costs of acquiring the electronic payment instrument 
(the “marketing” channel). We also show that social 
network effects played a significant role in propagat-
ing the adoption of electronic payment on the toll 
road system. The results in our article can be helpful 
in designing effective ways to implement various 
congestion relief policies. 
To frame our discussion, we first describe the 
evolution of the Illinois Tollway’s electronic payment 
option—a radio frequency identification device (RFID)—
brand-named I-PASS. Then, we take a closer look at 
the composition of payment choices by time of day 
and type of drivers, using hourly traffic data on Illinois 
Tollway payment. We find that even prior to the toll 
pricing change, I-PASS payments had the strongest 
appeal for drivers using toll roads on a regular basis 
and doing so in periods with the highest congestion. 
We further find that following the toll price change, 
all groups of drivers increased their I-PASS usage by 
roughly the same amount. To build intuition for fur-
ther investigation, we next sketch out a simple model 
of payment choice, which points to the central role  
of fixed participation costs and drivers’ income.4  23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
We also describe the construction of the data for 
evaluating the model’s predictions, and then we pres-
ent simple univariate summaries of the data in the form 
of tables and maps. After this, we provide an econo-
metric analysis of I-PASS demand at the aggregated 
zip code level, both before and after the price change. 
In particular, we focus on the importance of two key 
features of the new pricing regime—a change in rela-
tive prices and easier acquisition of I-PASS informa-
tion—for different income groups. 
Evolution of the payment choices on the 
Illinois Tollway
The current environment in the Chicago area pro-
vides one of the most fitting situations to analyze the 
use of electronic payments technology to reduce con-
gestion. Not only is Chicago the third most congested 
urban area in the U.S.,5 but it also has a long-standing 
economic reliance on transportation that derives from 
its geographic location at the nexus of the country’s trans-
portation networks. The very establishment of the city 
owed much to the desire to link the water routes of 
the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River. Waterways 
yielded to rail by the end of the nineteenth century, 
and in the 1950s and 1960s, the Chicago area was 
transformed for a third time with the growth of the 
federally sponsored interstate highway system and 
the construction of the Illinois Tollway, which spread 
out from Chicago to adjoining states.6 
Until the 1990s, the payment options on the roads 
overseen by Illinois Tollway seemed incongruous with 
the remarkably efficient transportation network that 
has kept Chicago on the country’s economic forefront. 
All vehicles were required to come to a full stop at toll 
plazas and pay either by handing cash to an attendant 
(manual lane) or by throwing exact change into a col-
lection bucket (exact change lane). Especially in com-
parison with other states’ tollway configurations, the 
Illinois Tollway’s manual lanes seemed to be a throw-
back to an older patronage age. For their part, exact 
change buckets were based on a relatively old technol-
ogy, which could be readily compromised by fraudsters.
To combat fraud and improve efficiency, in 1993 
the Illinois Tollway introduced an electronic payment 
option called the I-PASS. Cars equipped with an I-PASS 
RFID transponder have the correct toll amount de-
ducted electronically upon passing through specially 
equipped toll gates. Over the past decade, RFID tech-
nology has improved enough to allow I-PASS payments 
to be processed on vehicles traveling at highway speeds. 
In 2004, the Illinois Tollway unveiled plans to reduce 
road congestion by eliminating toll collection plazas. 
To implement this plan, the Illinois Tollway had to 
convince a critical mass of motorists to switch to 
electronic payments. Although the problem at hand 
looked simple enough, it faced most of the challenges 
of more radical reforms, such as variable pricing and 
transition to private ownership of roads. 
These challenges could be broken into three cate-
gories: optimal pricing choice, heterogeneity in drivers’ 
preferences, and coordination problems and network 
externalities. In tackling these issues, the Illinois Tollway 
needed to answer three questions. First, absent a  
politically unsustainable choice of mandating electron-
ic payments, what pricing incentives would be neces-
sary to effect the desired level of change? Not all 
motorists value the same driving attributes equally. 
Thus, they might respond to different aspects of pric-
ing arrangements, such as higher cost of non-electronic 
payments or easier acquisition of payment transpon-
ders. Second, what strategy could address these het-
erogeneous preferences? And third, what role do social 
networks play in a driver’s decision to switch? Being 
the only I-PASS user is worthless, since “no-stop” 
tolling lanes would never be put in place in such a 
case. On the other hand, learning that others have 
made the switch to electronic payments increases the 
attractiveness of such a choice by making the neces-
sary road reconfiguration more likely.7 
In an attempt to address these problems, the Illinois 
Tollway doubled the toll for cash payers on January 1, 
2005, but kept it unchanged (at $0.40 at most toll plazas) 
for electronic payers, the I-PASS clients. By drastical-
ly changing the relative prices of these two forms of 
payment in this natural experiment, the Illinois Tollway 
sought to achieve an outsized increase in usage of  
I-PASS over a short period. In advance of the price 
change, the toll road authority undertook a substantial 
advertising campaign, which emphasized both the 
cost advantages of I-PASS payments under the new 
pricing structure and the ease of acquiring and using 
the transponder.
Commuters and other travelers responded to the 
doubling of cash tolls by quickly switching to elec-
tronic payment in large numbers. Electronic toll share 
soared past 70 percent within a month of the new 
pricing regime going into effect.8 By the end of Janu-
ary 2005, about 1.9 million commuters had electronic 
payment devices—more than double the figure in 
June 2003 when the transponders were first sold on-
line. As the number of electronic payers shot up, the 
Illinois Tollway proceeded with its plans to add no-
stop tolling lanes.9 
While the toll hike for cash payers represented  
a 100 percent increase in toll outlays, the increase 

















































































































































































































































































After cash toll rate 
change
Notes: Data reflect only passenger vehicles without trailers. Drivers could start purchasing I-PASS transponders at Jewel-Osco stores in 
November 2003. In August 2004, the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority announced that tolls would be doubled for cash payers but kept 
unchanged (at $0.40 at most toll plazas) for electronic payers (I-PASS owners) starting in January 2005.
Source: Illinois State Toll Highway Authority.
millions of owners
the overall cost of commuting. Taking into account 
the full cost of operating a vehicle and a measure of 
the value of time spent in the commute, we estimate 
that higher cash tolls raised the overall commuting costs 
by more than 3 percentage points for only 10 percent 
of all Illinois Tollway drivers.10 The question then be-
comes how such a relatively small boost in overall 
costs could induce such a large consumer response. 
As we mentioned previously, the large aggregate in-
crease in I-PASS usage masks interesting heterogene-
ity in consumer payment choices, which we examine 
in the following section. As we explain later, the Illinois 
Tollway’s multipronged approach to inducing more  
efficient payment on its toll roads helped achieve this 
large aggregate increase among its heterogeneous 
consumer base.   
The toll pricing change and its aggregate 
effects 
Doubling the cash toll rates on January 1, 2005, 
produced an immediate and dramatic response in both 
the overall share of tolls paid electronically and in the 
number of I-PASS owners. As shown in figure 1, in 
slightly more than four months between the announce-
ment of the impending price change and the commence-
ment of the new regime on January 1, 2005, more than 
500,000 I-PASS transponders were purchased. About 
80 percent of these new accounts were originated in 
November and December of 2004. The pace of I-PASS 
ownership growth remained brisk for nearly a year, 
before leveling off in December 2005. 
The relative advantages of different payment meth-
ods fluctuate by time of day (for example, the level of 
congestion) and travel purpose (for example, the im-
portance of arriving at a destination on time). Presum-
ably, a more efficient and convenient electronic payment 
holds the greatest appeal for rush-hour commuters. 
We are able to identify such commuters from a spe-
cial survey of driver preferences, administered in  
November 2003.11 Figure 2 confirms that the Illinois 
Tollway is used almost exclusively by drivers com-
muting to work during the early morning hours and 
that such drivers also dictate traffic volumes in the 
evening rush between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m.25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Notes: Data were collected by the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority through its origin–destination survey that was mailed out to I-PASS 
users. In addition to questions on trip purpose, drivers were asked about the origin and destination of their travel, zip code of residence, 
frequency of toll trips, and participation in the I-PASS program.
Source: Illinois State Toll Highway Authority.
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Average share of I-PASS transactions, by time of day
percent
Notes: Data reflect only passenger vehicles without trailers. To limit the 
effects of weekend or vacation visitors to Chicago, this figure displays the 
results for Wednesdays during two months with limited vacation activity, 
March and April, in 2004 and 2005.
















Figure 3 depicts the share of I-PASS 
transactions by time of day, with two se-
ries representing payment compositions 
before and after the pricing change. Both 
series have two distinct humps corre-
sponding to peak times, effectively mir-
roring the fraction of tollway drivers that 
are commuting to and from work. This 
result confirms the basic intuition that 
even in the absence of price differences 
(for example, before the 2005 price hike 
for cash payment), electronic payment 
was embraced by frequent toll road users 
who put a relatively higher premium on 
convenience and potential improvement 
in travel times.
Interestingly, we find that after the 
price change went into effect, the in-
crease in I-PASS usage rates was nearly 
identical for motorists using the toll road 
system during rush hours, at midday, or 
throughout late night/early morning 
times. The upward shift in I-PASS usage 
is remarkably parallel over the entire day, 26 2Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
with about a 25 percentage point increase in electron-
ic toll shares under the new pricing regime. This find-
ing suggests that to a first approximation, commuters, 
as well as shoppers and leisure drivers, responded 
similarly to the change in toll prices, even though the 
Illinois Tollway benefits bestowed upon them tended 
to favor the commuters unequivocally.12 
To look more closely at the factors influencing 
the payment decisions of such disparate groups of 
drivers we need two things: first, a simple model of 
payment choice to build our intuition and inform sub-
sequent analysis of disaggregated data and, second, a 
description of data used to identify cost, intensity, and, 
most importantly, viability of tollway usage. These 
subjects are taken up in turn in the following sections.
A simple model of payment choice 
Around 40 years ago, Lancaster (1966) proposed 
that the demand for a particular good or service be 
decomposed into the demand for the underlying char-
acteristics of the item. For most transactions, the part 
played by the payment does not affect the enjoyment 
from the consumption of goods or services. This is not 
the case, however, on the Illinois Tollway, where a 
motorist paying electronically may potentially pro-
ceed through the toll plaza at highway speeds—a pro-
cess that is both more convenient and faster than the 
other payment options.13 Consequently, we will treat 
the payment choice in the context of a standard trans-
portation model of modal choice, where payment choice 
is isomorphic with lane choice. 
We use the simple model sketched out here as a 
useful device to build intuition for the empirical in-
vestigation, rather than to identify a specific expres-
sion for uncovering structural parameters of interest 
(for example, the relative value of goods and leisure). 
Although it is necessarily stylized, the model high-
lights the trade-offs made by drivers in choosing an 
appropriate payment method for their Illinois Tollway 
transactions. 
With this caveat in mind, assume that drivers’ 
preferences, U, are defined over consumption of 
goods and services, G, and leisure, L. This gives us:
1)  U = U(G, L), 
2)  L = T – H – N × tk(D) – 1ipass tF (d, E),
3)  G =V + w × H – N × ck(D) – 1ipass cF,
where T is the total time available, H is hours worked, 
N is the number of tollway trips per unit of time, and 
tk (D) is the amount of time spent on a trip of length 
D using payment method k. Note that 1ipass is an indi-
cator function set equal to 1 if the individual purchas-
es an I-PASS and that tF(d, E) is the time required to 
do so given the physical distance to the nearest retail 
outlet, d, and the ease of acquiring necessary informa-
tion, E. Turning to equation 3, V measures household 
wealth, w is the hourly wage rate, ck(D) are toll out-
lays per D-mile-long trip using payment method k, 
and cF is the monetary cost of acquiring an I-PASS. 
We assume that cF consists only of deposit and carry 
costs and thus is identical for all households as long 
as they face the same set of market interest rates. Un-
like Train and McFadden (1978), we treat the number of 
hours spent working as exogenous, since each agent’s 
occupational choice is divorced from his or her opti-
mal transportation decision (and even more so from 
the decision to pay tolls using an I-PASS transponder 
or cash).14 
To build intuition for the trade-off, assume for the 
moment that the higher commuting costs are associat-
ed with shorter times spent in commute (for example, 
tollway travel is faster than travel on smaller and 
more congested freeways).  In other words, (∆c/∆t) < 0. 
In this case, a driver would prefer the payment and 
time combination k to some alternative k′ if 
4) ( / ) , U c t U L G ≥ − × ∆ ∆
where, ∆c = ck(D) – ck′(D), ∆t = tk(D) – tk′(D), and  
UL and UG are evaluated at consumption and leisure 
levels associated with choice k. Equation 4 simply 
says that the marginal gains in leisure from shorten-
ing the commute (weighted by the marginal utility of 
leisure itself) must be greater than the marginal cost 
in terms of consumption goods associated with this 
choice (again weighted by the marginal utility of 
consumption).
The trade-off in equation 4 is easy to generalize  
to other aspects of payment choice, where a particular 
payment alternative provides greater benefits (for ex-
ample, faster service, greater reliability, easier use, 
greater convenience, or better dispute resolution) at 
additional cost. The choice then becomes one be-
tween a cheaper but less attractive payment mecha-
nism and a costlier but more desirable one. For 
example, very affluent New Yorkers were willing to 
pay a 25 percent premium in excess of first-class 
fares on competing commercial airlines to fly on the 
Concorde from New York to Paris in order to arrive 
in less than half the time. 
For Illinois Tollway drivers, this marginal trade-
off was never as dramatic. Even prior to the toll price 27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
change, the convenience of I-PASS and the possibility 
for faster travel it offered were counterbalanced by the 
carry cost of the $10 I-PASS deposit and of the out-
standing transponder balance. Following the change in 
the relative toll prices, electronic toll payments of-
fered both a cheaper and faster (more reliable, easier) 
way to travel. Restating this in terms of equation 4, 
switching to I-PASS generates a positive marginal 
“trade-off” (∆c/∆t > 0) which means that the optimal 
solution to this problem is one where all motorists 
pay electronically. This clearly isn’t the case in the 
real world.15
The leading candidate for explaining this puzzle 
is the existence of fixed participation costs, which can 
preclude (or perhaps delay) the adoption of a dominant 
payment mechanism. Intuitively, high participation costs 
may make the overall utility of having a transponder 
lower than that of continuing to pay cash tolls, even 
though at the margin, electronic payments are preferred 
by all. These costs derive from having to acquire new 
information and skills, and have been shown to play a 
role in explaining other consumer choices, such as non-
participation in equity markets (see Heaton and Lucas, 
1997; and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). As the relative 
price advantage of I-PASS increased, the threshold 
level of participation costs must have fallen, drawing 
more drivers toward I-PASS. Also, as mentioned ear-
lier, the advertising campaign that accompanied the 
pricing change, along with information spillovers 
from those who adopted I-PASS earlier, have likely 
combined to decrease the cost of information 
acquisition.16
The simple framework in equation 4 can be mapped 
to the data by assuming a particular preference speci-
fication, as illustrated in appendix 1. More generically, 
one can infer that electronic toll payment is most bene-
ficial for households that obtain the greatest gains in 
leisure from paying electronically and those that in-
cur the smallest losses in consumption from I-PASS 
acquisition. These observations lead to the following 
set of hypotheses for empirical testing.
n  As wages (or wealth) increase, the relative loss  
of consumption from bearing the fixed cost of 
purchasing an I-PASS (cF) is smaller. This is 
especially true if the number of hours spent at 
work is an increasing function of income, at  
least over some range. As a consequence, drivers 
with higher income and/or wealth are more likely 
to use I-PASS. 
n  Lower fixed costs of learning about and 
acquiring the I-PASS increase the likelihood of 
electronic toll payment. To the extent education 
or English fluency proxy for the ease of acquiring 
information, we would expect better educated 
nonimmigrant households to be more likely to 
own I-PASS. The same logic should hold for all 
other characteristics that reduce participation or 
learning costs, such as proximity to I-PASS retail 
outlets and informational spillover effects from 
neighbors or coworkers. 
n  As commuting distances get longer (higher N),  
the cost difference between cash and I-PASS toll 
payments matters more, again making drivers 
who travel longer distances more likely to 
purchase I-PASS. Moreover, drivers with higher 
N are also more sensitive to time spent in their 
commute, tk(D), which also pushes them toward 
using I-PASS.
In sum, the demand function for I-PASS owner-
ship may be written in the following reduced form: 
prob(I-PASS use) = f(income or wages, tollway travel 
factors, participation costs), where tollway travel fac-
tors include cost, distance, time, and congestion char-
acteristics of toll road trips and where participation 
costs encompass both the ease of learning about and 
the ease of acquisition of an I-PASS transponder.
Some accounting
Before taking a look at the data, it is useful to set 
out some accounting identities. The overall I-PASS 
demand in some geographic unit (say, zip code) with 
population p derives from demands by different 
groups, such as workers, retirees, and students. As de-
scribed later, we have data on everyday commuting 
choices of workers, which include the origin and des-
tination of the commute, mode of transportation cho-
sen, and time spent on the commute. Consequently, 
we are able to measure many of the components of 
the I-PASS demand function for workers, including 
the likelihood of using the tollway for commuting.17 
In contrast, there is very little information about trav-
el patterns of other types of drivers (for example, stu-
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Here, i denotes the number of I-PASS accounts 
owned by different driver segments. Those commut-
ing to work are further described by their current 
commute mode (d = driving, nd = public transport or 
other options, such as walking) and feasibility of toll-
way use (t = likely tollway user, f = likely freeway user). 
Since the easiest way to transform the probability of 28 2Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
I-PASS ownership to an empirically observable ag-
gregate measure is by expressing it as a fraction of a 










































































































Here, n denotes the total number of people in a 
given group and f (∙) represents a generic demand func-
tion of I-PASS ownership from the preceding section. 
For workers who could potentially use the tollway for 
their daily commute, f is a function of their known 
commute characteristics: toll costs, travel time, and 
congestion. If f is linear, as will be assumed for em-
pirical analysis, each of these commuter-specific argu-
ments should be multiplied by (nd,t + nnd,t)/p.18 Other 
determinants of tollway demand would be common 
to all drivers—those using the tollway to commute  
to work or for leisure—and would thus receive a full 
weight of 1. These determinants would include the 
distance to the tollway from the place of residence, 
distance to I-PASS retail outlet, measures of income, 
and education level, among others.
Data construction
The data that we analyzed for this article were 
obtained primarily from two sources: the Illinois State 
Toll Highway Authority and the U.S. Census Bureau 
(specifically, the 2000 U.S. Census). From the former, 
we received data on I-PASS ownership by zip code 
and I-PASS usage and lane configurations by plaza. 
We also gathered public information about toll costs, 
plaza locations, and exit specifications (the onramp 
and offramp directions) from the Illinois Tollway web-
site. From the latter, we received and used zip-code-
level economic and demographic information, as well 
as journey-to-work data linking census tract of resi-
dence with census tract of work.19 We then merged all 
of these data into a single data set of economic, de-
mographic, and geographic information by zip code 
of residence, described in more detail later.20
I-PASS ownership data
The data set on I-PASS ownership details the to-
tal number of accounts and transponders by zip code. 
This information was provided for two time periods, 
August 2004 and February 2005, which were chosen 
because they fall right before the announcement of 
the Illinois Tollway’s congestion relief plan and shortly 
after the rate change went into effect, respectively. 
The number of accounts and transponders are sums of 
individual accounts, as opposed to corporate accounts, 
for zip codes of residence. 
Zip-code-level data from the 2000 U.S. Census
Similar to the I-PASS ownership information, the 
U.S. Census provides economic and demographic data 
at the level of zip code of residence. Among numerous 
other variables, included in this data set are variables 
describing income, education, length of residency, and 
population. Specifically, we chose the following vari-
ables as regressors in our model: the population of 
people 16 years and older, household median income, 
the number of households in five different income groups, 
the length of residency in the U.S., and the fraction of 
the population 25 years and older with college or ad-
vanced degrees. We felt that the population of those 
16 years and older was representative of those people 
who could have I-PASS accounts because they are of 
working age and, more importantly, of driving age. All 
household variables were normalized by this number. 
Beyond the conventional variables likely to in-
fluence the decision to get I-PASS, we were also in-
terested in determining whether the convenience of 
getting I-PASS and exposure to information about it 
matter. To capture the former, we computed the dis-
tance from each zip code to the nearest point of sale 
for I-PASS transponders—a chain of grocery stores 
(Jewel-Osco) and the Illinois Tollway headquarters. 
We used the degree to which one’s neighbors and co-
workers were getting on the “I-PASS bandwagon” as 
measures of information spillovers or network effects. 
For each zip code, we constructed a population-weight-
ed average of I-PASS ownership rates in “adjacent” 
zip codes (those within a 5-mile radius from the zip 
code center). We followed a similar approach to com-
pute I-PASS ownership rates among coworkers, using 
census-tract-level data on work and residential loca-
tion, described in the following section. 
U.S. Census tract data on daily commuting choices
The U.S. Census provides detailed demographic 
and economic variables that relate to workers and 
their commutes to work in the Census Transportation 
and Planning Package (CTPP)—a special tabulation 29 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
of responses to the Census long form questionnaire, 
mailed to one in six U.S. households. Specifically, the 
“Journey-to-Work” part of the CTPP provides data by 
pairing place of residence and place of work. For 
each origin–destination pair, we know the number of 
workers making the commute, the length of time in 
the commute, the form of transportation they use, and 
their income.21
The U.S. Census provides this detailed information 
at the level of census tract, a geographical definition 
that is much smaller in size than a zip code. Aggre-
gating these data to the zip code level (as described in 
appendix 2) allowed us to estimate how many work-
ers commute from their zip code of residence to each 
of the other zip codes in our geography. 
Although this summary is sufficient to compute 
the weighted averages of commuting times, we need-
ed to determine whether it would be reasonable for a 
commuter to take the tollway to work. To do this we 
employed a simple model of tollway choice (also de-
scribed in appendix 2). In essence, each origin–desti-
nation pair of zip codes (say, A and B) was judged to 
be “potentially” suitable for tollway travel on the basis 
of two simple metrics: whether an online trip-plan-
ning software (MapQuest) recommended the tollway 
for all or part of the trip, and whether a trip from A to B 
via tollway was “excessively” longer than a straight-
line route (“as the crow flies”). Using this methodology, 
we were able to impute whether a commute between 
each of our 656,600 origin–destination pairs would 
involve the tollway, as well as the approximate daily 
commuting distance.
At this point, we have all of the variables of in-
terest relating to the commuting patterns of workers 
in our sample. Because all of our other data are at the 
level of zip code of residence, we need to aggregate 
our specific commuting path variables of workers re-
siding in a given zip code across all destinations. To  
do this, we form weights by taking the number of 
workers unique to each origin–destination pair over 
the sum of all workers at the zip code of origin. These 
weights are calculated separately for all workers, 
workers likely to use the tollway, and workers unlike-
ly to use it. They are then are used to compute mea-
sures of commute characteristics representative of the 
entire zip code of origin.
In the end, we are left with a data set that includes: 
the zip code of residence; I-PASS ownership; neigh-
bors’ I-PASS ownership; coworkers’ I-PASS owner-
ship; the smaller of the distance to the nearest Jewel-Osco 
store or the Illinois Tollway headquarters; distribution 
of income, educational attainment, and length of U.S. 
residency within a zip code; separate estimates of 
travel time and distance to work for tollway and non-
tollway commuters; and estimated tollway commuter 
toll costs. 
A first look at the data
Here, we take an initial look at the data with the 
simple bivariate contrasts. We do this by focusing on 
the data’s geographic representation. We also exam-
ine the data’s correlation structure, noting the relation-
ships between the level of I-PASS ownership and various 
economic, demographic, and geographic characteris-
tics at the zip code level, in both August 2004 and 
February 2005—the dates falling right before the  
Illinois Tollway officially announced its congestion 
relief plan and shortly after the toll rate change took 
place, respectively. We find median household in-
come to be a key factor in the decision to own an  
I-PASS and, therefore, provide summary statistics by 
income groups. 
Geographic representation 
Because of the geographical nature of both the 
toll roads and the zip code information on I-PASS 
ownership, a first pass at analyzing our data is best 
accomplished with maps. In order to focus on the 
main body of commuters who live close to the city, 
we center the maps on the seven counties that include 
the City of Chicago and surround it: Cook, DuPage, 
Kane, Kendall, Lake, McHenry, and Will. All maps 
present information at the zip code level. Since we 
are most interested in the geographic penetration of  
I-PASS, figure 4 exhibits the ratio of I-PASS transpon-
ders to the adult population in August 2004. The zip 
codes are shaded from light gray to dark gray, repre-
senting increasing I-PASS ownership rates.22 Figure 5 
presents the same information in February 2005, high-
lighting geographic distribution of the effects of the 
toll price change on I-PASS ownership. 
As shown in figure 4, by August 2004, I-PASS 
ownership rates reached significant levels around the 
area where most of the tolls roads converge, which is 
about 15 miles from the downtown Chicago area.  
I-PASS rates remained mostly above 15 percent in 
zip codes along the toll roads as they move out far-
ther from Chicago. At about 20 miles to 30 miles out-
side the city center, there are pockets of even higher 
I-PASS ownership along all of the toll roads. The larg-
est pocket of dark gray area surrounds the intersection 
of I-88 with I-355. This higher density could partially 
reflect the history of I-PASS, which was first intro-
duced on I-355 in 1993 and then expanded onto I-88 
in 1994. In contrast, most other areas did not have the 
electronic payment option until 1997. It is interesting to 30 2Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
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    0.00  to 0.15     0.15 to 0.35     0.35 to 1.00
Notes: The adult population includes everyone aged 16 years and older. For an explanation of white areas, see note 22.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority and U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 U.S. Census.
note, however, that although I-294 also received I-PASS 
technology in 1994, I-PASS ownership is not as con-
centrated in this area. In general, we do not observe a 
drop-off in the ownership rates along the tollway until 
reaching locations about 40 miles away from Chicago 
and at least 15 miles away from the toll road itself.
Figure 5 is significantly darker than figure 4, in-
dicating increased I-PASS penetration by February 
2005, after the rise in cash toll prices. The February 
2005 map presents a similar pattern to that in the  
August 2004 map; however, the areas of medium 
gray (the middle range) and dark gray (the high 31 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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    0.00  to 0.15     0.15 to 0.35     0.35 to 1.00
Notes: The adult population includes everyone aged 16 years and older. For an explanation of white areas, see note 22.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority and U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 U.S. Census.
range) both appear to have significantly spread out, 
shrinking the lowest range. Because many areas of 
light shading became medium and many areas of me-
dium became dark, figure 5 conveys the sense that the 
increase in I-PASS ownership was fairly evenly 
spread across this seven-county region over the 
course of these six months. The fairly uniform geo-
graphic “deepening” of I-PASS ownership dovetails 
with the parallel rise in I-PASS usage across commut-
er types, depicted earlier in figure 3 (p. 25). 
In figure 6, the income levels of zip codes in our 
data sample are broken into three categories on the 32 2Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
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    Below $60,000     $60,000–$80,000     Above $80,000
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 U.S. Census.
basis of income quartiles of working household from 
the 2000 U.S. Census. The light gray represents zip 
codes with a median household income below $60,000, 
and the dark gray corresponds to zip codes with a  
median household income above $80,000.23 As one 
might expect, with only a few exceptions the higher-
income zip codes tend to be very close to the tollway 
system. Given the income makeup displayed in figure 6, 
one can assume that there is a premium for living closer 
to the tollway system, since it serves as a gateway for 33 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
mobility within this region. Initially, one would there-
fore expect to see higher I-PASS ownership in these 
areas, both because of the ability to afford the setup 
costs for electronic payment and the proximity and 
likely frequent use of the tollway itself. Looking back 
at figure 4, this is clearly the case, as I-PASS owner-
ship rates above 15 percent are registered almost ex-
clusively in areas where median income is greater than 
$80,000, our highest income group. This concentration 
of high income and high I-PASS ownership suggests 
that before the price hike for cash payments, income 
was the main determining factor in the decision to own 
an I-PASS. Furthermore, this observation might help 
to explain why I-PASS ownership is lower in those 
areas around the southern and northern parts of I-294, 
even though they have been exposed to the technolo-
gy for a similar length of time as those areas around 
I-355/I-88. Indeed, the areas around the southern and 
northern parts of I-294 have relatively lower median 
household income compared with those around I-355/
I-88. Interestingly, by February 2005, I-PASS owner-
ship exhibits less of a dependence on income. Figure 
5, for instance, looks remarkably similar to figure 6, 
reflecting a pickup in I-PASS ownership rates across 
all three income groups. 
Correlation structure
We can conduct a preliminary empirical evalua-
tion of I-PASS acquisition by looking at the correla-
tions between the level of I-PASS accounts and various 
economic, demographic, and geographic characteris-
tics at the zip code level in both periods—August 
2004 and February 2005. We also examine indirectly 
the population of new I-PASS owners by looking at 
the differences in I-PASS account concentrations be-
tween these two dates. These owners are the infra-
marginal group of drivers who did not switch initially 
in the old pricing regime, because the time advantag-
es of I-PASS ownership did not outweigh the costs; 
however, this group switched to the I-PASS after the 
new pricing regime became evident. 
Table 1 presents simple pairwise correlations 
built up from our basic information at the zip code 
level. It is apparent that I-PASS ownership is ex-
tremely persistent, with near-perfect correlation at the 
zip code level between August 2004 and February 
2005. As with the maps, the most notable feature of 
the correlation structure is the central role played by 
household income. Not only does income have a 
strong positive relationship with I-PASS ownership,  
it is also strongly correlated with a number of key 
variables such as education and likelihood of tollway 
use. Median worker income had a stronger correlation 
with the choice to own I-PASS prior to the price change 
(ρ = 0.70 for the share of I-PASS accounts in August 
2004 in column 1, row 4) than with the choice to own 
it following the price change (ρ = 0.58 for the change 
in I-PASS accounts in column 3, row 4). I-PASS pen-
etration by August 2004 is strongly correlated with the 
fraction of workers in a zip code that potentially could 
take the tollway to work, if they were to drive (ρ = 0.70, 
column 1, row 7). It is informative that this relation-
ship is somewhat weaker for the change in I-PASS 
ownership over the period from August 2004 to Feb-
ruary 2005 (ρ = 0.63, column 3, row 7). This finding 
suggests that after the new pricing regime went into  
effect, I-PASS ownership became somewhat less tied 
to strictly work-related travel.
The negative correlations between distance (and 
similarly for travel time and toll costs) with both the 
August 2004 I-PASS ownership rate and the change 
in this rate may be surprising at first glance. It should 
be noted, however, that the commuting distance has a 
relatively strong negative correlation with the median 
income (ρ = –0.38, column 4, row 10) and the fraction 
of all workers who could use the tollway to get to work 
(ρ = –0.59, column 7, row 10). On most commutes, 
the distance variable includes not only the tollway seg-
ment but also the distance in getting to the tollway and 
in getting from the tollway to work. It therefore appears 
likely that longer commutes for potential tollway users 
are generally associated with zip codes that are actu-
ally quite far from the tollway. In such zip codes, fewer 
commuters use the tollway, which translates into a 
smaller demand for I-PASS. Next, a significant nega-
tive correlation between the median income and dis-
tance variables suggests that lower-income drivers 
are the ones making the longer distance commutes  
(a point underscored earlier in figure 6).
Comparing the correlations of both periods’ aver-
age share of I-PASS only lanes along the likely tollway 
commuting routes suggests that there was relatively 
little supply effect in play by early 2005. Before the toll 
price change, I-PASS lane ratios and the number of  
I-PASS accounts were negatively correlated (ρ = –0.20, 
column 1, row 12). This can be explained by the fact 
that I-PASS lanes were first added to mainline plazas, 
which had lower relative use of I-PASS due to the 
higher diversity of users at these plazas.24 The I-PASS 
lane ratios for July 2004 and January 2005 are virtu-
ally uncorrelated with each other, as most of the pla-
zas that received I-PASS lanes by July 2004 did not 
gain any by January 2005, while most of the plazas 
that had no I-PASS lanes in July 2004 received at 
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  TABlE 2
Income group summaries
Panel	A.	Summary	statistics	and	I-PASS	acquisition	costs	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 Mean
	 Number	 	 Median	income	 Mean	share	 Mean	share	 distance	to
Income	 of	zip	 Total	adult	 of	a	working	 of	college	 of	recent	 I-PASS
group	 codes	 population	 household	 graduates	 immigrants	 sales	outlet
	 	 (million)	 (dollars)	 	 	 (miles)
Low  152  2.49  53,989  0.12  0.11  7.11
Middle  271  3.41  70,838  0.19  0.08  6.36
High  138  2.45  88,100  0.39  0.06  2.41
Panel	B.	Driving	choices	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 Mean	
	 	 	 Share	likely	 Share	likely	 commute		 Mean	
Income	 Number	of	 Share	driving	 driving	to	work	 driving	to	work	 of	likely	 distance
group	 workers	 to	work	 on	a	freeway	 on	a	tollway	 tollway	driver	 to	tollway
	 (million)	 	 	 	 (miles)	 (miles)
Low  1.30  0.74  0.64  0.11  43.90  13.41
Middle  2.11  0.85  0.68  0.16  40.26  10.97
High  1.70  0.82  0.59  0.23  32.34  6.58
Notes: In both panels, all reported means across zip codes in a given income group are population-weighted. The low-income group consists of zip 
codes with a median household income below $60,000. The middle-income group consists of zip codes with a median household income between 
$60,000 and $80,000. The high-income group consists of zip codes with a median household income above $80,000. The U.S. Census defines 
recent immigrants as those who immigrated to the U.S. from 1990 through 2000. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority and U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 U.S. Census.
Summary statistics by income groups
Given the primary importance of income, we 
next present summary statistics of the key variables 
in the I-PASS ownership decision by income group. 
Specifically, we compare characteristics of zip codes 
in which the median income of working households 
was below $60,000, between $60,000 and $80,000, 
and above $80,000; in table 2, we label these income 
groups as low, middle, and high, respectively. As shown 
in panel A of table 2, these three income groups account 
for 152, 271, and 138 zip codes with populations of 
2.5 million, 3.4 million, and 2.5 million residents aged 
16 years and older, respectively. As hypothesized, resi-
dents of wealthier zip codes likely have lower costs 
of acquiring I-PASS information and purchasing the 
transponder: Wealthier zip codes have substantially 
higher education levels, have a lower share of recent 
immigrants, and are located much closer, on average, 
to I-PASS retail outlets (2.4 miles versus 7.1 miles). 
Panel B of table 2 presents the driving choices 
made by members of different income groups. Although 
the residents of high-income zip codes have only a some-
what greater propensity to drive to work, the break-
down between likely tollway and freeway travel is 
quite different. Among residents of high-income zip 
codes, nearly one in four would likely find it advanta-
geous to commute to work via the tollway (again, the 
likelihood is determined by their residential location 
and work destination vis-à-vis the toll road network). 
In contrast, the toll road choice would be appealing to 
only 11 percent of lower-income zip code residents. 
Similarly, the appeal of the Illinois Tollway for non-
work travel, as gauged by the distance to the nearest 
tollway exit, is likely greater for high-income zip 
codes. This difference reflects the strategic choice of 
many high-income households to live in neighbor-
hoods close to the tollway, which serves as a conve-
nient gateway for their workday commutes and 
leisure activities. 
In table 3, we take a closer look at the most ac-
tive tollway users—those who currently drive to work 
and whose residence and work locations suggest toll-
way commutes. Table 3 summarizes the overall com-
muting distance, as well as the monetary toll payments, 
for such drivers, again by the three income groups we 
established in table 2. To derive distance estimates (as 
shown in panel A of table 3), we sum the actual length 
of the tollway segment and the two straight-line off-
tollway segments connecting the two zip codes.26  
Remarkably, our mapping of the tollway and U.S. 
Census information suggests that the median tollway 
commuter in the high-income group travels around 
60 miles per day. The median tollway commute among 
residents of the low-income zip codes is nearly 20 
percent longer (approximately 72 miles per day). 
These differences get magnified substantially in the 36 2Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
  TABlE 3
Trip distance and toll payments of likely tollway commuters, by income group
Panel	A.	One-way	total	distance	to	work,	including	tollway	and	nontollway	segments	 	      
             
Income	 	 	 	 	 	 Interquartile
group	 10th	percentile	 25th	percentile	 Median	 75th	percentile	 90th	percentile	 range
  (-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	miles	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	)		
Low  26.2  29.9  36.0  44.5  78.9  14.6
Middle  21.9  26.1  34.1  49.9  64.9  23.8
High  21.1  24.0  29.2  33.6  40.2  9.6
Panel	B.	 	 Annual	toll	payments	before	the	toll	increase,	assuming	240	workdays	and	
	 														one	round	trip	each	workday	
Income	 	 	 	 	 	 Interquartile
group	 10th	percentile	 25th	percentile	 Median	 75th	percentile	 90th	percentile	 range
  (-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	dollars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	)		
Low  244  248  286  374  518  126
Middle  225  255  314  373  457  118
High  215  236  267  323  385  87
Notes: Likely tollway commuters are defined as those who do drive to work and whose residence and work locations suggest tollway commutes. 
The low-income group consists of zip codes with a median household income below $60,000. The middle-income group consists of zip codes with 
a median household income between $60,000 and $80,000. The high-income group consists of zip codes with a median household income above 
$80,000.  
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority and U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 U.S. Census.
  TABlE 4
I-PASS ownership ratios, by income group
	
	 Relative	to	 Relative	to	workers	 Relative	to	likely
	 adult	population		 who	drive	to	work		 tollway	commuters
Income
group	 Aug.	2004	 Feb.	2005	 Aug.	2004	 Feb.	2005	 Aug.	2004	 Feb.	2005
	 (	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	percentage	points	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	)
Low  2.7  5.2  6.8  13.4  48.2  95.0
Middle  10.6  18.3  20.3  34.8  104.2  179.1
High  26.5  39.9  46.7  70.2  166.0  249.5
Notes: The adult population includes everyone aged 16 years and older (legal driving age in Illinois). The population of workers who drive to work 
is determined on the basis of the Census Transportation Planning Package 2000, “Journey-to-Work.” Likely tollway commuters are defined as those 
who	do drive to work and whose residence and work locations suggest tollway commutes. The low-income group consists of zip codes with a median 
household income below $60,000. The middle-income group consists of zip codes with a median household income between $60,000 and $80,000. 
The high-income group consists of zip codes with a median household income above $80,000.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority and U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 U.S. Census.
tails of the distribution. About 10 percent of tollway 
drivers in low-income zip codes travel in excess of 
150 miles per day just to get to work and back, while 
a comparable figure for high-income zip codes is 
“only” around 80 miles! However, the disparities in 
total toll payments across income groups are not 
nearly as dramatic (see panel B of table 3). Indeed, 
the median drivers in all three income groups pay  
approximately the same amount in tolls. This result 
serves as yet another indicator that low-income toll-
way users spend a smaller fraction of their overall 
commute on the tollway, as they live in neighborhoods 
farther away from the toll road network. 
Table 4 allows us to compare I-PASS ownership 
before and after the change in the price for cash tolls 
across income groups for three different population 
slices: the adult population (that is, those of legal 
driving age, which is 16 in Illinois), the number of 
workers who drive to work, and the number of such 
drivers who would be likely to use the toll roads.27 
The results for these three different denominators  
essentially parallel each other, and thus, we focus on 
the likely toll road commuters for convenience. Even 
prior to the increase in cash tolls (in August 2004), 
the number of I-PASS transponders approximately 37 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
equaled the number of likely tollway commuters for 
the middle-income group, and exceeded it substan-
tially for the high-income group. In contrast, I-PASS 
penetration among residents in low-income zip codes 
stood at about 50 percent of the likely daily tollway 
commuters. 
The dramatic relative price change on January 1, 
2005, and the concurrent advertising campaign were 
sufficient to boost percentages across all income groups, 
while roughly preserving dramatic differences in rela-
tive levels of ownership. After the toll price change, 
I-PASS penetration among likely tollway drivers reached 
95 percent for the low-income group. Among residents 
of the more affluent neighborhoods, I-PASS owner-
ship vastly exceeded the number of the daily tollway 
commuters, suggesting the appeal of the electronic 
payment option even for the occasional tollway driv-
ers in those areas.
Our tables and maps loosely appear to tell the 
following story. Prior to the change in toll pricing 
structure, residents of high-income zip codes (partic-
ularly those living close to the toll road network) ac-
counted for the lion’s share of I-PASS accounts. 
These consumers used the tollway frequently, and thus 
assigned higher value to convenience and faster travel 
times, even in the absence of cost savings. Once the 
relative prices changed, I-PASS usage rates rose for 
motorists of all types. For drivers residing in low- 
income zip codes, the number of I-PASS accounts  
after the price change nearly matched the number of 
likely tollway commuters, while for high-income zip 
codes such accounts far surpassed the population 
likely to use I-PASS on the daily commute. 
Regression analysis of I-PASS ownership
There are two key questions that cannot be resolved 
with the simple bivariate contrasts presented in the 
previous section. First, did variables associated with 
the daily tollway commute—distance, cost, and con-
gestion—affect the payment choice either before or 
after the pricing change? And second, did different 
aspects of the pricing change—higher cash toll payments 
and exposure to advertising—have a differential effect 
on the payment choice of different income groups? 
These questions can only be entertained in a multi-
variate regression framework, to which we turn next. 
The econometric model and variable selection
Since our dependent variable is expressed as a 
proportion of a zip code’s population that owns an  
I-PASS, we naturally use a grouped logit estimator. 
Assuming that this proportion, (i/p)z, follows a logis-
tic distribution (that is, (i/p)z = Λ(βXz)), where Λ is 
the appropriate cumulative distribution function, al-
lows us to restate it as a log odds ratio, which is lin-
ear in the vector of regressors X. The resulting 
regression specification takes the form:
6)  ln[(i/p)z / (1 – i/p)z] = βXz + εz ,            
which is estimated by weighted least squares to account 
for heteroscedasticity induced by aggregating the data 
over geographic units with different characteristics. The 
weights are given by [pzΛ(βXz)(1 – Λ(βXz))]1/2, where 
pz is population in zip code z, and Λ(βXz) is based on 
first-stage (ordinary least squares, or OLS) estimates 
of β. 
Based on the preceding discussion, the vector of 
explanatory variables X is broken into several sub-
sets. The first group of regressors captures the propor-
tion of households in a given zip code that fall into 
various annual income categories, $15,000–$35,000, 
$35,000–$75,000, $75,000–$150,000, and above 
$150,000, with households whose income is less than 
$15,000 per year constituting the omitted category. The 
next subset is meant to capture the ease of learning 
about and acquiring I-PASS that stems from general 
education and familiarity with existing institutions 
and technology. It consists of the share of a zip code’s 
population that are college graduates, as well as the 
share made up by recent immigrants. The following 
subset is also focused on gauging costs of participa-
tion in the I-PASS program, and it includes the dis-
tance to the nearest I-PASS retail outlet, as well as the 
measure of I-PASS penetration in neighboring zip 
codes. To gauge the likelihood of using the tollway 
for any purpose, we include the distance to the near-
est tollway exit from the zip code of residence. All of 
these variables are applicable to the entire population 
of a zip code, and so they can be thought of as captur-
ing a common component of I-PASS demand among 
all groups in equation 5 (p. 28). 
The final subset of explanatory variables consists 
of the arguments of the I-PASS demand function for 
likely tollway users that commute to work daily, as 
outlined previously in the subsection where we dis-
cussed some accounting identities. These variables 
are available only for workers, and hence would be 
applicable to the I-PASS demand function of com-
muters only.28 Specifically, these variables include 
weighted averages of the commuting time for likely 
tollway drivers, these drivers’ estimated toll costs, 
and the share of I-PASS only lanes encountered along 
the commute route. While the last variable can be 
thought of as a measure of congestion, it also likely 
reflects the supply side of the I-PASS infrastructure. 38 2Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
  TABlE 5





   
Share of households with income in $15,000–$35,000 range  2.53  3.63
  (2.1)  (2.0)
Share of households with income in $35,000–$75,000 range  5.18  6.17
  (8.6)  (6.6)
Share of households with income in $75,000–$150,000 range  5.44  6.35
  (8.1)  (6.3)
Share of households with income above $150,000  3.91  4.76
  (5.8)  (4.6)
Share of population with a bachelor’s degree or more  1.41  1.47
  (6.4)  (4.9)
Share of recent immigrants   –0.83  –0.85
  (–2.6)  (–2.0)
Share with I-PASS in neighboring zip codes in August 2004  1.95  1.82
  (10.8)  (7.4)
Distance to the nearest tollway exit  –0.07  –0.05
  (–6.9)  (–2.4)
Distance to the nearest Jewel-Osco store (miles)  –0.02  –0.02
  (–5.9)  (–0.9)
Share of likely tollway commuters  0.35  0.19
  (0.5)  (0.4)
Average travel time × Share of likely tollway commuters  0.04  0.04
  (3.2)  (2.3)
Average toll costs × Share of likely tollway commuters  0.46  0.38
  (0.7)  (–0.4)
Average share of I-PASS only lanes in July 2004 ×  
  Share of likely tollway commuters  2.97  3.47
  (1.7)  (1.5)
   
Constant  –6.89  –7.78
Number of observations  547  271
Adjusted R-squared  0.86  0.84
Root mean square error  0.42  0.40
 
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses, and the standard errors are not corrected for spatial correlation. The adult population includes everyone 
aged 16 years and older. Likely tollway commuters are defined as those who	do drive to work and whose residence and work locations suggest  
tollway commutes. The second column of results drops all zip codes outside of Cook County, where the City of Chicago is located, and the six 
counties surrounding it. The U.S. Census defines recent immigrants as those who immigrated to the U.S. from 1990 through 2000.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority and U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 U.S. Census. 
As suggested by equation 5, each of these regressors 
is multiplied by the share of likely toll commuters, 
(n/p)z, to account for the fact that they capture only a 
part of total I-PASS demand.
This model is used to analyze the tollway pay-
ment choice under the old, non-price-differentiated 
regime, as well as the choice to acquire the I-PASS 
under the new pricing regime. The null hypotheses—
outlined in the section presenting our simple model of 
payment choice—form our benchmark for evaluating 
estimated regression coefficients. 39 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The case of identical marginal prices for cash and 
I-PASS in August 2004
The dependent variable in this case is defined as 
the number of I-PASS transponders registered in a 
given zip code in August 2004 normalized by the 
number of residents aged 16 years and older in that 
zip code. We refer to this variable as “I-PASS owner-
ship rate.” Table 5 presents the results from estimat-
ing equation 6 on the joint Illinois Tollway–U.S. 
Census data set.29 
The first column of results shows the “base case” 
specification. We find strong positive effects of income 
on I-PASS ownership, as higher shares of zip code 
population in each income range above $35,000 are 
associated with higher I-PASS penetration rates in 
August 2004. We further find that zip codes with 
higher education levels have higher I-PASS penetra-
tion rates, even after controlling for direct effects of 
income. The share of population made up by recent 
immigrants has a negative effect on ownership shares; 
presumably, their costs would tend to be higher be-
cause of greater language and institutional knowledge 
barriers to obtaining I-PASS. Although this effect is 
statistically significant, it is not economically large as 
shown later. Still, other variables meant to gauge par-
ticipation costs come in very strongly. In particular, 
all else being equal, I-PASS penetration rates are 
higher for those living closer to I-PASS retail outlets 
(Jewel-Osco grocery stores) and those living “close” 
to zip codes with high I-PASS ownership. The latter 
result may reflect information spillovers from one’s 
neighbors, but since our “neighborhood” variable is 
somewhat crude and is measured contemporaneously, 
we do not focus on it heavily.30
For the subset of “tollway travel” variables, we 
find higher I-PASS ownership for zip codes with 
higher shares of likely tollway drivers, as well as for 
zip codes where such likely tollway drivers face lon-
ger commutes to work. Those with commuting routes 
more heavily saturated with I-PASS only gates are 
only marginally more likely to own I-PASS transpon-
ders (p value of 0.09). These results line up well with 
the hypotheses outlined previously. Interestingly, the 
only “tollway travel” variable not found to affect  
I-PASS choice in August 2004 is toll costs. Since at 
that time there was no cost differential between elec-
tronic and cash toll payments, toll outlays would not 
have been expected to play a role in the I-PASS ac-
quisition decision. 
The base case regression explains a significant 
amount of variation in I-PASS ownership prior to the 
pricing change, with the adjusted R-squared value of 
0.86. Although high R-squared values are not unusual 
in grouped data settings that suppress within-group 
variation, the general consistency of estimated coeffi-
cients with predictions of a simple economic model is 
comforting.
All of the significant variables in the base case 
specification are significant at the 1 percent level or 
better. However, in order to address their economic 
significance, we need to obtain estimates of their mar-
ginal effects on I-PASS ownership. It is difficult to 
interpret the magnitude of reported coefficients as 
marginal effects of X on the probability of I-PASS 
ownership, since the dependent variable is a nonlin-
ear function of this probability. One common choice 
is to report exponentiated coefficients eβ as marginal 
effects for the odds ratio of I-PASS ownership. How-
ever, we choose to predict these effects at mean val-
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The strongest marginal effect derives from zip 
code concentration in the $75,000–$150,000 range.  
A zip code that consists of 29 percent of such house-
holds (75th percentile value) is estimated to have an 
I-PASS ownership rate that is 5.1 percentage points 
higher than a zip code in which only 14 percent of 
households fall in this income range (25th percentile 
value). At first glance, an increase of 5.1 percentage 
points may seem insignificant, but one needs to keep 
in mind that the unconditional mean of I-PASS own-
ership as a fraction of population aged 16 years and 
older amounted to only 12.9 percent in August 2004.31 
Relative to this benchmark, the estimated effects of 
moving from one end of the interquartile range to the 
other are as follows: share of college graduates (+1.3 
percent), share of recent immigrants (–0.3 percent), 
distance to nearest Jewel-Osco store (–2.5 percent), 
distance to the tollway (–3.0 percent), commute time 
(+1.4 percent), share of I-PASS only lanes (+0.7 per-
cent), and share of I-PASS penetration rates in neigh-
boring zip codes (+3.0 percent). Thus, the key variables 
appear to be both economically and statistically 
significant.
We also estimate the base case specification on a 
subset of zip codes that constitute the “greater Chicago” 
area. Our definition of greater Chicago is rather infor-
mal, as it simply encompasses Cook County, where 
the City of Chicago is located, and the six counties 
surrounding it. Drivers residing outside of this area 
may differ on a number of dimensions. Importantly, 
fewer of them work in or near Chicago, and thus they 40 2Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
rarely encounter the heavy congestion experienced by 
urban and suburban drivers. They also have to pass 
fewer tolls gates on their commutes, suggesting they 
place a somewhat lower value on electronic toll pay-
ment. The second column of results in table 5 suggests 
that the only difference from eliminating these distant 
zip codes is the disappearance of proximity to Jewel-
Osco stores as an explanatory factor. Jewel-Osco 
stores are fairly uniformly distributed throughout the 
greater Chicago area, and thus proximity to them 
does not help differentiate zip code demand for I-PASS. 
This result suggests the possibility that the negative 
coefficient on the distance to a Jewel-Osco store in 
the base case formulation may capture not only the 
higher cost of I-PASS acquisition for those living  
farther away from such a store, but also lower I-PASS  
demand among drivers living outside the greater  
Chicago area who have other commuting alternatives.
The pricing experiment: Doubling of cash tolls and 
using an advertising campaign
We look at the change in I-PASS ownership be-
tween August 2004 and February 2005 to analyze the 
effects of the pricing increase. Given the overriding 
importance of income in the preceding analysis, we 
estimate the regressions of change in I-PASS on three 
distinct income subsamples used in the earlier tables 
and presented in figure 6 (p. 32). To restate, the new 
pricing regime had two distinguishing characteristics: 
a dramatic change in relative prices for cash and elec-
tronic payments and a widespread advertising cam-
paign that presumably lowered participation costs for 
I-PASS acquisition.32 We are interested in whether 
these two effects had different (or any) effects for 
payment choice in each of the income groups. Given 
the very high rates of I-PASS participation among 
residents of wealthy zip codes (see table 4, p. 36)  
prior to the change and the parallel shift in ownership 
thereafter, we hypothesize that the incremental de-
mand in these zip codes derived from incidental toll-
way users who were attracted by the convenience of 
I-PASS use and acquisition. In contrast, we would 
expect the residents of low-income zip codes, whose 
use of I-PASS was much less common prior to the 
price change, to be affected by the toll hike for cash.
The regression results, presented in table 6, help 
to illuminate these hypotheses. Even though we form 
the subsamples on the basis of median household in-
come, nearly every zip code contains households in 
each of the income categories. For all three income 
groups, the effects of income distribution are quite 
uneven and typically not statistically significant. Among 
households in high-income zip codes, the income dis-
tribution is not found to have any effect on the decision 
to acquire the I-PASS after the price change. For 
households in low-income zip codes, the coefficient 
for the fraction in the top income category stands out, 
largely because there are very few such households 
(1.5 percent) residing in these zip codes. Also, in con-
trast with the earlier results, there is no evidence of a 
relationship between education levels and I-PASS 
ownership for any of the income subsamples.
The other variables associated with participation 
costs are neighboring zip code effects and proximity 
to an I-PASS retail outlet. We find strong evidence 
that I-PASS ownership rates in neighboring zip codes had 
a positive effect on the increase in I-PASS use. More-
over, the magnitude of this effect is relatively stron-
ger for low- and middle-income zip codes, suggesting 
a possibility of stronger informal spillover effects there. 
Interestingly, living farther away from a Jewel-Osco 
grocery store is estimated to have a negative effect on 
I-PASS purchases after the toll hike for cash only in 
middle-income and high-income zip codes. 
In contrast, the doubling of cash tolls per se gen-
erated a statistically significant response only among 
residents of low-income zip codes. The comparison 
of coefficients on “average toll costs” across the three 
income groups in table 6 reveals a strong positive ef-
fect of toll costs on incremental I-PASS ownership 
for low-income zip codes and virtually no effect for 
the two higher-income categories. In fact, for middle-
income and high-income zip codes, the likelihood of 
acquiring I-PASS after the pricing change was nega-
tively related to commuting time, suggesting that 
heavy commuters had likely purchased transponders 
well before the new regime went into effect.
In sum, we find some evidence that, on average, 
low-income zip codes responded to the cost doubling 
aspect of the toll pricing change, while medium-in-
come and high-income neighborhoods were affected 
by the convenience of I-PASS acquisition through 
heavily advertised retail outlets. This breakdown is 
consistent with the picture presented in the summary 
tables, where the number of I-PASS accounts relative 
to the number of likely regular tollway users (that is, 
commuters) was extremely high in wealthy zip codes 
even prior to the price change. Consequently, incre-
mental I-PASS use could only have come from more 
occasional users who responded to the advertising 
campaign. I-PASS ownership in low-income zip codes 
also rose to include nearly all regular tollway com-
muters, who were apparently held back by high par-
ticipation costs (whether real or perceived) and who 
were faced with the prospect of nominal toll outlays 
being doubled if they continued to shun the electronic 
payment option. 41 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
  TABlE 6
Change in I-PASS ownership following the toll rate increase for cash
Weighted	least	squares	logistic	regression	on	zip-code-level	grouped	data	 	 	  
   
Dependent	variable:	Change	in	share	of		 Low-	 Middle-	 High-
zip	codes	with	I-PASS	relative	to	adult	population	 income	 income	 income
     
Share of households with income in   –0.733  2.197  –4.403
  $15,000–$35,000 range  (–0.3)  (1.4)  (–0.53)
Share of households with income in   2.599  4.611  –0.158
  $35,000–$75,000 range  (2.6)  (4.3)  (1.75)
Share of households with income in   5.625  3.896  0.504
  $75,000–$150,000 range  (5.6)  (4.0)  (0.52)
Share of households with income   18.102  5.791  –0.170
  above $150,000  (18.1)  (2.5)  (0.63)
Share of population with a bachelor’s degree   –0.214  0.116  –0.744
  or more  (–0.3)  (0.3)  (0.21)
Share of recent immigrants  0.359  –0.035  –0.495
  (0.7)  (–0.1)  (0.42)
Share with I-PASS in neighboring zip codes   1.447  1.440  0.553
  in August 2004  (5.7)  (5.7)  (2.69)
Distance to the nearest tollway exit  –0.058  –0.059  –0.063
  (–4.2)  (–5.9)  (5.7)
Distance to the nearest Jewel-Osco store (miles)  0.008  –0.010  –0.029
  (1.7)  (–2.6)  (–3.16)
Share of likely tollway commuters  –5.095  5.600  4.871
  (–0.9)  (4.4)  (2.23)
Average travel time × Share of likely tollway commuters  0.002  –0.101  –0.082
  (0.0)  (–3.8)  (–0.68)
Average toll costs × Share of likely tollway commuters  4.614  0.931  –0.262
  (2.1)  (0.9)  (1.74)
Average share of I-PASS only lanes in January 2005 ×   20.031  –0.584  –2.063
  Share of likely tollway commuters  (2.3)  (–0.2)  (0.77)
Constant  –5.637  –6.462  –1.361
Number of observations  137  263  151
Adjusted R-squared  0.78  0.78  0.51
Root mean square error  0.41  0.38  0.32
 
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses, and standard errors are not corrected for spatial correlation. The new I-PASS owners are defined as 
February 2005 owners less the August 2004 owners. The adult population includes everyone aged 16 years and older. Likely tollway commuters  
are defined as those who do drive to work and whose residence and work locations suggest tollway commutes. The low-income group consists of  
zip codes with a median household income below $60,000. The middle-income group consists of zip codes with a median household income  
between $60,000 and $80,000. The high-income group consists of zip codes with a median household income above $80,000. The U.S. Census 
defines recent immigrants as those who immigrated to the U.S. from 1990 through 2000.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority and U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 U.S. Census.
Conclusion
In an attempt to accelerate the adoption of its 
electronic payment system, the Illinois State Toll 
Highway Authority adopted a new toll pricing struc-
ture at the beginning of 2005 that strongly penalized 
cash payments. While in nominal terms the tolls were 
doubled for cash, as a percent of overall explicit and 
implicit outlays for autos, this toll hike was relatively 
small. Nonetheless, the pricing change induced a very 
broad spectrum of drivers to switch to electronic pay-
ment. Without more detailed information on those who 
use the toll roads but continue to pay with currency,  42 2Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
11The Illinois Tollway conducted the origin–destination survey 
along toll plazas on I-88, with the survey instrument handed out to 
motorists paying cash tolls or mailed out to I-PASS users. The  
response rates for the two groups were 24 percent and 76 percent, 
respectively. In addition to questions on trip purpose, drivers were 
asked about the origin and destination of their travel, zip code of 
residence, frequency of toll trips, and participation in the I-PASS 
program.
12Whereas the costs of acquiring and maintaining an electronic 
transponder are similar for commuters and leisure drivers, greater 
tollway utilization by the former group necessarily generates high-
er monetary and time savings. 
13I-PASS payers have additional choices as they approach plaza 
gates. They are free to choose any gate, which will automatically 
register their payment electronically. Ordinarily, the I-PASS gate 
will be the fastest, but motorists have the option of choosing another 
gate when it is seemingly going to be faster.
14The assumption of work hours as a perfectly flexible decision vari-
able of households has received less and less empirical support in 
the recent research in the labor supply literature. For two recent exam-
ples, see Altonji and Usui (2005) and Aaronson and French (2004).
15One could assume that all remaining cash payers are transient 
drivers who view their tollway trips as one-time events. At the 
peak of the morning rush hour after the price hike, the fraction of 
cash payers (15.6 percent) seems too large for that to be a fully  
satisfactory explanation.
16Another disadvantage of I-PASS is the potential loss of privacy, 
which distinguishes it from cash; see appendix 3. Some motorists 
place a very high value on their anonymity, which can be modeled 
through their preferences. While we acknowledge the relative prev-
alence of such tastes, we do not seek to quantify them empirically.
17The algorithm for gauging the likelihood of the tollway commute 
is described in detail in appendix 2.
NOTES
it is difficult to know how to convert a significant pro-
portion of the remaining drivers to I-PASS, at least 
without a further substantial increase in relative costs. 
However, we find that following the price change, 
the number of I-PASS accounts among residents of 
low-income zip codes nearly reached the number of 
likely tollway commuters (presumably the group with 
the most intense demand). For residents in more afflu-
ent locales, I-PASS ownership levels greatly exceed-
ed the number required to satisfy tollway commuting 
demand. The high levels of I-PASS ownership after 
the price change reflect occasional, non-work-related 
tollway use, which is likely more important in more 
affluent neighborhoods in part because they are often 
located relatively near the tollway. A variety of evidence 
suggests that income was an important determinant of 
I-PASS ownership. Our regression evidence further 
suggests that cost was a consideration for the low- 
income group, but not for the more affluent groups 
that were influenced by the ease of getting I-PASS. 
The verdict on whether the price increase and the 
attendant jump in I-PASS ownership will result in 
congestion relief has to wait until the conclusion of 
the open road tolling construction program. However, 
the results of this natural experiment do suggest that a 
combination of mass marketing and toll price chang-
es can redirect enough drivers from cash to electronic 
payment to allow congestion relief to move from the 
drawing board to the roadway.   
1A number of recent papers have studied other aspects of designing 
and implementing congestion relief policies. For instance, Small, 
Winston, and Yan (2005) obtain estimates of commuters’ value of 
time using data on choices of the commuters who participate in the 
variable-pricing experiment in Orange County, CA. Small, Winston, 
and Yan (2006) focus on the design of optimal pricing policies, 
taking into account their political sustainability.
2In this article, both the system of roads and the Illinois State Toll 
Highway Authority itself are referred to as the Illinois Tollway.
3Open road tolling, also called “no-stop” tolling, refers to a toll 
road system on which payments are collected electronically from 
vehicles traveling at highway speeds. 
4Although I-PASS is currently used as a congestion pricing mecha-
nism for trucks, it is not currently used for this purpose for passen-
ger cars.
5Texas Transportation Institute (2005).
6The Illinois Tollway is located in the northern part of the state 
with spokes going north to Wisconsin, west to Iowa, and south to 
northwestern Indiana from Chicago.
7This argument only works up to a point, since making roads less 
congested may invite enough new motorists to make traffic worse 
than it had been before. The behavioral response to a change in a 
decision-making environment is similar in spirit to the study by 
Peltzman (1975) on whether mandatory seat belt use generates an 
overall reduction in road fatalities. 
8Governor Rod Blagojevich unveiled the plan on August 25, 2004, 
and the board of directors for the Illinois Tollway approved it on 
September 30, 2004.
9Open road tolling (no-stop toll payment collection) had been im-
plemented at most toll plazas by the end of 2006.
10A detailed account of the assumptions used for this imputation is 
available on request.43 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
18We also consider the case of separate demand functions for every-
day and occasional commuters (nd,t and nnd,t).
19The “zip code data” are actually reported by the U.S. Census-de-
fined geographic areas called zip code tabulation areas (ZCTAs), 
which cover essentially the same geography with some minor dif-
ferences. For a description of ZCTAs see www.census.gov/geo/
ZCTA/zcta.html. For simplicity, we refer to ZCTAs as zip codes 
throughout this article.
20Stata programs used in constructing this data set are available 
upon request. 
21We used the travel time for those who drive alone to work, since 
it seems to be the purest measure of the travel time between the or-
igin and destination. The travel time for those who carpool, for ex-
ample, could include several stops and would not be representative 
of the actual commute.
22In some cases the Illinois Tollway was not able to filter out com-
mercial I-PASS accounts if the registrant gave a business address 
but applied under his/her own name. Therefore, there are a handful 
of zip codes that have too many I-PASS accounts per person to be 
plausible for personal use (a ratio of above one transponder per 
person). These zip codes are indicated as white areas in the maps 
and are ignored in the analysis.
23 The three income groups (below $60,000, between $60,000 and 
$80,000, and above $80,000) are made up of 152, 271, and 138  
zip codes, respectively. The cutoff points represent the 25th and 
75th percentiles of working household income in the zip codes in 
our sample. Since figure 6 is centered on a smaller seven-county 
area, the income grouping appears biased toward the higher-income 
groups. 
24Mainline plazas are not entry or exit points but rather through 
points where tolls are collected. Plazas at onramps and offramps 
are more likely to serve users from the distinct areas where they 
are located, whereas mainline plazas would likely serve users  
from any area geographically preceding it (in other words, main-
line plazas would serve a more diverse population). It is also likely 
that mainline plazas see a higher rate of incidental travelers who 
drive longer distances than plazas at onramps and offramps.
25Around 70 percent of those plazas that did not have I-PASS lanes 
in July 2004 did receive at least one by January 2005. Only 25 per-
cent of those with at least one I-PASS lane in July 2004 received 
one more by January 2005. Overall, most plazas did not increase or 
decrease their total number of I-PASS lanes.
26Here, as elsewhere in this article, distance is measured between 
the centroids of two zip codes.
27Some workers live in an area where taking the Illinois Tollway to 
work is an option. However, they report that they currently use 
some alternative transportation, such as light rail, train, or bus.
28For commuters judged likely not to use toll roads, the imputed 
cost and tollway congestion variables would be zero. Thus, their  
I-PASS demand would derive from characteristics unrelated to 
their work commute, similar to retirees, students, and other seg-
ments of the population without a daily commute to work.
29Most of the explanatory variables are time-invariant; that is, they 
are taken from the 2000 U.S. Census and are thus common to re-
gressions explaining I-PASS ownership at either of the two dates 
for which we have data (August 2004 and February 2005). The few 
variables that could be obtained separately for 2004 and 2005 in-
clude: the share of I-PASS only lanes along a commute route and  
I-PASS ownership in neighboring zip codes. Note that the first of 
these variables combines time-invariant origin–destination data 
from the U.S. Census with time-specific data from the Illinois 
Tollway that reflect current lane configuration. 
30One way to check for the importance of simultaneity is to run a 
regression for February 2005 I-PASS ownership using the August 
2004 fraction of households with I-PASS in neighboring zip codes 
as a control. This regression (not shown) produces effectively the 
same results; this is not surprising given the very high autocorrela-
tion (0.98) in I-PASS penetration rates. Also, omitting the neighbor-
ing zip codes’ I-PASS rates altogether does not have a qualitative 
effect on any of the estimated coefficients.
31Recall that the much higher figures of 40 percent to 45 percent  
I-PASS usage before the pricing change referred to the share of all 
tollway traffic paying tolls electronically. Clearly, tollway users repre-
sent only a small fraction of the population aged 16 years and older.
32The advertising campaign made it easy to acquire information 
about the features of I-PASS accounts and to learn about the 
Illinois Tollway’s plans for changes in lane configurations that fa-
vored electronic payments. The campaign also made obvious the 
large relative difference in cash toll prices, with the words “twice 
as much” and “double the cost” featured prominently in media 
coverage of the impending change.44 2Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
APPENDIx 1. CONVERTING THE PAYMENT MODE MODEL TO AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL: AN 
ILLUSTRATIVE ExAMPLE
To map the simple framework of equation 4 (p. 26) to 
data, one needs to assume a specific functional form for 
preferences. As an example, we analyze the constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) preference specification.1 
Let the I-PASS choice correspond to a cost and time pair 
{tT, cT}. Suppose that commuting costs cT consist of a 
fixed setup cost (F), opportunity or carry cost (O), mar-
ginal per plaza cost (mT), and the number of toll gates 
taken over the unit of time in our analysis (N). More-
over, assume that setup costs are a function of an indi-
vidual’s demographics, such as education level and/or 
access to low-cost subscription technologies, for exam-
ple, the Internet. 
Then for the I-PASS transponder choice T of indi-
vidual i, equation 3 (p. 26) becomes
A1) ( , ) , , G V w H O F E w N m i T i i i i i i T = + × − − − ×
where the fixed costs F are a function of education Et 
and wages wi.
And for the other two lane choices, the exact 
change lane or attendant lane, equation 3 becomes
A2) . , G V w H N m i e i i i i T = + × − ×
It also does not seem unreasonable to assume that for 
many the time spent at work is an increasing function of 
wage. For example, salaried employees in at least some 
professional occupations (for example, consultants, at-
torneys, and architects) are more often required to work 
longer hours or put forth a greater intensity of effort. 
Under this assumption, and keeping in mind that both w 
and H are exogenous, we can restate equation 2 (p. 26) as 
A3) L H w N t L i T i i T , ( ) ( ) . = × − − × × 24 60
 
Let the CES utility be given by the following: 
U G L G h L ( , ) [ ] ,
/ = + ×
− − − ρ ρ ρ 1
where h is the relative price of leisure (G is a numeraire), 
and the elasticity of substitution between consumption 
and leisure is (1/1 + ρ). To introduce uncertainty in this 
preference framework, assume that h is measured with a 
multiplicative error ε, which is lognormally distributed.2 
Using equation 4, the probability of signing up for an  
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Our discussion here has focused on the choice be-
tween the I-PASS and a single alternative (say, the exact 
change toll). Consequently, the binary specification in 
equation A4 can be estimated in a simple logit framework, 
using an estimator adjusted for grouped data. The major 
advantage of this approach is that it allows us to simpli-
fy the machinery for empirical analysis considerably 
while still being able to identify parameters of interest.
1Other preference specifications would produce the same qualita-
tive predictions, but differ in terms of the economic interpretation 
of the coefficients. 
2Alternatively, we can assume that G and/or L are measured with 
error. A prime candidate for measurement errors is participation 
costs F, many of which are implicit.45 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The U.S. Census provides detailed information on home-
to-work commutes at the level of census tract, a geographi-
cal unit that is generally much smaller in size than a zip 
code. Census tracts are not necessarily fully contained in 
a given zip code but can overlap one or more zip codes. 
Furthermore, a zip code in our sample generally contains 
several census tracts or parts of several census tracts. These 
overlaps present the obvious problem of ascertaining 
how to equate the census tract data to zip-code-level data. 
In order to transform these data from census tract to 
zip code, we employed the mapping software, Maptitude. 
From this software, we were able to obtain the propor-
tion of each census tract in each of the zip codes that it 
overlaps. Because we did not know the geographic dis-
tribution of workers over a given census tract, we made 
the simplifying assumption that they were evenly dis-
tributed. This assumption allowed us to cleanly allocate 
workers in a given census tract to each of its correspond-
ing zip codes by the proportions of their relationships. 
Since the data come in pairs relating to a commute pat-
tern, this allocation must be performed for both the ori-
gin and destination census tracts. Once all of the workers 
of these census tract commute pairs were assigned pro-
portionally to zip code commute pairs, the worker data 
could be summed up by unique zip code pairs. We then 
calculated a weighted average of travel time and income, 
using as weights the proportion of workers in a specific 
census tract pair to total workers residing in a given zip 
code. In the end, we know who goes to work where, whether 
they drive there, how much time it takes, and how much 
money they earn by zip codes. At this point, we do not 
know, however, what path they take to get there.
Since the Illinois Tollway is the focus of our study, 
we needed to find a way to determine whether it would 
be reasonable for a commuter to take it to work. We de-
cided to first determine what a tollway trip would entail 
for each zip code of residence going to all zip codes with-
in our sample. Again, we used Maptitude to assist in this 
determination. First, we used this mapping software to 
create a file that contained the longitude and latitude of 
the center points of all zip codes in our sample. From 
this file, we were able to determine the straight-line dis-
tance (as the crow flies) between all of our zip code pairs 
and what direction the destination is from the origin.
Next, Maptitude includes a point layer that details 
the longitude and latitude of all exits on all highways as 
well as toll plaza points on tollways.1 We merged these 
data with information from the Illinois Tollway’s web-
site detailing which of these points allow a vehicle to get 
on or off the tollway and in what direction. The file on zip 
code geography was matched to the exit file. We then se-
lected the two closest onramps to each origin zip code 
and the two closest offramps to each destination zip 
code that allowed the commuter to go in the direction of 
her commute. Next, we summed up the distance from 
the center point of the origin zip code to the entry point, 
the distance between all points on the path between the 
entry and exit points on the tollway, and the distance 
from the exit point to the center point of the destination 
zip code, giving us the total distance of the tollway com-
mute. Since we did this for each of the entry–exit point 
combinations, we determined up to four unique paths.2 
We then picked the shortest commute pattern for each 
zip code pairing using the tollway.
While this allows us to know how a commuter liv-
ing in one zip code and working in another would travel 
to work using the tollway, we still did not know whether 
they were likely to take this path or drive on more con-
venient freeways at their disposal. To resolve this, we 
need a model of tollway versus freeway choice. Clearly, 
commuters living farther away from the tollway are less 
likely to use the tollway as their commuting venue than 
those living closer. After a variety of trial-and-error cal-
culations, we decided to exclude zip codes that were 
more than 40 miles from the toll road. For those driving 
to work and living within a 40-mile radius, however, it 
would still not necessarily be economical to use the toll 
road if the time spent on other nontollway roads was 
sufficiently shorter. But distance alone is not the only 
consideration: More direct routes would entail less driving 
but would often include more congestion—that is, on 
such routes, motorists might encounter a greater number 
of irritations along the way in the course of numerous 
daily commutes. 
To account for these possibilities, we settled on a 
simple geometric metric to determine whether the toll-
way was a feasible choice or not. If the distance of the 
straight line (as the crow flies) between the A and B zip 
code centroids, say,  ABcf
  
, was at least X percent of the 
distance from the center of zip code A to zip code B using 
the tollway,  ABtw
  
, then the motorist would use the 
tollway. That is, if  AB X AB cf tw
     
> × , then the motorist 
would use the tollway; otherwise the motorist would 
not. The value we settled on for X is described in the  
following paragraphs.
We used MapQuest to determine whether this com-
mon online direction tool would indicate using the toll-
way between each of our zip code pairs. A comparison 
of MapQuest predictions with the simple geometric 
measure revealed a fair number of inconsistencies. In 
most cases, for zip code pairs that were designated for 
tollway travel by the “crow flies” model, but not by 
MapQuest, the total distance traveled was relatively 
large. Similarly, the opposite was true when travel dis-
tances were relatively small. 
We then needed a way to determine which of the 
two approaches was a better predictor of tollway use. 
We chose to do this by comparing the average number 
of vehicles that entered and exited the tollway on each 
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onramp and offramp during the rush-hour period with 
the number of workers we expected to do so based on 
each of the two models. Both methods worked fairly 
well, but the “crow flies” model had a better fit for lon-
ger distances and the MapQuest method for shorter 
ones. Because MapQuest calculates paths based on per-
fect driving conditions, this discrepancy may be ex-
plained by the fact that during rush-hour commutes, the 
longer one travels, the more opportunities there are for 
adjusting one’s route in response to road conditions.3
Finally, we decided to combine the two methods, 
allowing MapQuest to indicate tollway use for shorter 
distances and the “crow flies” method for longer distances. 
The cutoff that we found to maximize the latter method’s 
precision was 0.49. In other words, it was assumed that 
in a populated area, such as the greater Chicagoland area, 
there would be another route between the two points that 
would take less than the tollway travel time if the toll-
way route is more than about twice the direct distance. 
Overall, the distance threshold that maximized the accu-
racy of the combined model was 18 miles. In sum, if the 
distance between two zip code center points was less 
than or equal to 18 miles, we let MapQuest determine if 
the tollway was the preferred route; if the distance be-
tween the zip codes was greater than 18 miles, our 
“crow flies” model would indicate toll road use if the 
path along the toll road was less than twice as long as 
the actual distance between the zip code pair. This hy-
brid model had a correlation of around 0.8 with the rush-
hour vehicle data. 
1In many cases, exits and toll plazas are the same points. There are 
numerous exits that do not have toll plazas. Also, there are toll pla-
zas at points along the tollway that are not exits, but simply collec-
tion points. 
2In cases where the origin zip code is closest to a tollway that does 
not intersect with the tollway to which the destination zip code is 
closest, the commute was deemed impossible given these exit pair-
ings. Therefore, there would not be four unique commuting pat-
terns in these cases. The chance of this occurring is what led us to 
find up to four commuting possibilities, with the hope of getting at 
least one possible tollway commuting path. If all four paths are de-
termined impossible, we assume that the commuter does not take 
the tollway to get to work.
3There is also a geographic reason why the “crow flies” approach 
works in the outer counties. In the absence of natural barriers on 
the flat Illinois prairie, outer counties have a grid-like pattern of 
town, county, and state roads, which almost always provides sim-
ple alternatives to toll or interstate roads and which natives from 
the region intuit. In urban areas, these alternatives are more diffi-
cult to divine without local knowledge that takes into account the 
existence of more barriers to the free flow of traffic. 
1In many cases, respondents provided more than one answer. As a 
result, there were over 50 percent more responses than there were 
respondents.
2I-PASS records can be subpoenaed in both civil and criminal court 
proceedings. Some respondents were worried that their individual 
travel information could be used against them. In particular, they 
speculated that it could be used to fine them for speeding on the 
tollway, which is not actually the case. 
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In late November and early December of 2004, just be-
fore the price hike, surveys were distributed to Illinois 
Tollway users at five locations: one plaza each on the 
North-South Tollway (I-355) and the North Tri-State 
Tollway (I-94/I-294) and three locations around I-55, 
which lies near the Illinois Tollway. The survey collect-
ed information about the origin and destination of a par-
ticular trip, the purpose of the trip, the trip’s frequency, 
vehicle occupancy, and vehicle type. Respondents were 
asked whether they owned an I-PASS. Those who did 
not own an I-PASS were asked two final survey ques-
tions: Why have you not purchased I-PASS and what would 
convince you to purchase I-PASS? Respondents were al-
lowed to choose from a provided list of multiple choice 
answers or substitute their own answer if the multiple 
choice categories did not represent their own beliefs.1
The predominant response to the first question (why 
have you not purchased I-PASS?) was that the respon-
dent had not (yet) made the effort. One interpretation of 
this response is that the majority of those surveyed did 
intend to purchase I-PASS, but were late responders. Re-
call that the toll price hike was scheduled to go into ef-
fect a few weeks later. Those respondents who made more 
than one trip per week still answered that summoning up 
the effort to get a transponder was the main inhibitor. 
While this answer was the second most popular answer 
for those who traveled less frequently than weekly, they 
most often answered that they had not purchased an I-PASS 
because they rarely used the toll roads. In over 20 per-
cent of returned surveys, respondents wrote in their own 
answers. Of these, privacy was by far the most cited 
reason for the hesitation or refusal to purchase I-PASS.2
The majority of the responses to the second ques-
tion (what would convince you to get an I-PASS?) match 
up well with the basic findings of our research. Namely, 
most drivers answered that they would purchase I-PASS 
to avoid paying higher tolls. More importantly, this re-
sponse held across all motorists in terms of frequency 
of trips, suggesting that further penetration of I-PASS 
was likely to happen across all groups of Illinois Tollway 
motorists. 47 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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